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The Nature of the Cambridge Heterodoxy 
Nuno Ornelas Martins *
Résumé
Dans cet article, je discute de la manière dont le réalisme critique
en économie peut contribuer à l’élaboration d’une théorie
économique et sociale alternative. Les contributions de la tradition
de Cambridge en économie, qui a également influencé le réalisme
critique en économie, se révèleront précieuses dans ce contexte. Je
ferai valoir que, même si une reprise précoce de l’économie
politique classique dans la tradition de Cambridge se concentre sur
la reproduction des structures économiques, le réalisme critique en
l’économie s’est intéressé, quant à lui, à la reproduction des
structures sociales. Ce dernier permet ainsi la reprise d’un cadre qui
existait au sein de l’économie politique classique, et qui fut porté à
son stade le plus avancé par Marx. Ce cadre est axé sur la
reproduction économique d’un surplus, et sur sa distribution
(institutionnelle) à travers les différentes classes sociales sous une
structure sociale. L’ontologie sociale du réalisme critique nous
permet de comprendre pourquoi l’étude de la reproduction d’un
système (relationnel) est le meilleur point de départ pour le
développement de la théorie économique et sociale.
Mots clés : réalisme critique, tradition de Cambridge, ontologie
sociale, politique économique classique
Abstract
In this paper I discuss how critical realism in economics can help
under-labouring for an alternative economic and social theory. The
contributions of the Cambridge tradition in economics, which also
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influenced critical realism in economics, will prove most useful for
developing an alternative economic and social theory. I will argue
that while an earlier revival of classical political economy in the
Cambridge tradition focused on the reproduction of economic
structures, critical realism in economics has been concerned with
the reproduction of social structures. I will discuss how these
projects recover the framework that existed within classical
political economy, and was brought to its most advanced stage by
Marx. Such a framework focused on the economic reproduction of
a surplus, and on its (institutional) distribution through the various
social classes under a given social structure. The social ontology of
critical realism enables us to understand why the study of
reproduction of a (internally related) system is the best starting
point for the development of economic and social theory.
Keywords: Critical realism, Cambridge tradition, social ontology,
classical political economy
JEL Classifications: B41
INTRODUCTION
Geoffrey Harcourt (2003) refers to three key characteristics in
John Maynard Keynes’ thinking which are relevant for
understanding the Cambridge economic tradition: the whole is more
than the sum of the parts; agents act in a context of inescapable
uncertainty; and the existence of a plurality of languages.
The fact that the whole is more than the sum of the parts can be
seen as a consequence of the fact that each part is also constituted
by the relation in which it stands to other parts of a whole. This
type of relation can be termed internal relation, and has been much
discussed by philosophers in Cambridge for a long time, not least
under the influence of British idealists like F. H. Bradley (who was
at Oxford) and J. E. M. McTaggart (who was at Cambridge),
amongst others, who developed the philosophy of internal relations
of Friedrich Hegel. Alfred Marshall was influenced by this Hegelian
perspective, as Simon Cook (2009) notes, and it played an important
role in the formation of the Cambridge economic tradition, shaped
by Marshall.
The notion of internal relation has been recently recovered in
Cambridge within critical realism in economics. Lawson (2003,
p. 17) writes: “Aspects or items are said to be internally related
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when they are what they are, or can do what they do, by virtue of
the relations in which they stand”. It is not sufficient to have the
sum of the parts, if we do not include also the (internal) relations
between the parts.
Another fundamental idea developed within critical realism in
economics is the distinction between closed systems and open
systems. Closed systems are systems in which constant conjunctions
of the form “if event X then event Y” are ubiquitous, and open
systems are those in which this is not the case. According to
Lawson (1997, 2003), the social realm is characterised by internal
relations and open systems.
The question that follows is how to study reality, if the latter is
open, and internally related in complex ways. This is a problem that
was addressed early on within the Cambridge economic tradition.
Marshall (1920[1890]) provided his method of partial equilibrium as
a solution for the problem of internal relations. Piero Sraffa
criticised this approach, and developed an alternative way for taking
into account internal relations, while engaging in a revival of
classical political economy.
I argue that while the revival of political economy in the Sraffian
branch of the Cambridge tradition focused on the reproduction of
economic structures (essentially on the reproduction and distribution
of the economic surplus), critical realism in economics has been
concerned with the reproduction of social structures, which take
place trough the activity of social agents, as they reproduce the
economy and society. In so doing, these different projects attempt to
recover the framework of classical political economy, as brought to
its most advanced stage by Marx. And they are underpinned by an
ontological conception which has been elaborated more
systematically by Lawson (1997, 2003).
THE METHODOLOGY OF CRITICAL REALISM IN
ECONOMICS
According to critical realism in economics, ontology is the study
of the nature and structure of reality. Ontology is inherently a critical
project, in the sense that it looks for the conditions of possibility of
events, by questioning our conceptions about reality, rather than by
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simply positing (uncritically) a given conception. In ontological
enquiry, conditions of possibility need not be found only in the
subjective categories of our understanding, which we use when
reasoning (as in Immanuel Kant’s critical, but idealist, approach).
The question is not only how must our mind be like in order for
certain experiences to take place, but also what must reality
(including our mind) be like. To do so, we must also recognise the
existence of an intransitive reality outside our conceptions, which is
expressed by our conceptions. Our conceptions, however, are
transitive, subject to revision through critical scrutiny.
Such a critical and realist approach is in stark contrast with
approaches that simply assume a certain set of methods or
postulates which are not (critically) questioned. Mainstream
economics, for example, is characterised by a given type of
methods, namely mathematical-deductivist methods, which are
uncritically accepted—see Lawson (1997, 2003). These methods
have been successfully employed in the natural sciences, where
mathematical regularities exist (as in astronomy) or can be achieved
through experimental control, so that underlying structures, powers,
mechanisms and tendencies are identified. But these methods have
performed poorly in the analysis of social reality, leading to the
failure of mainstream economics, where a critical assessment of
these methods has not been made.
In the social realm, we cannot create experiments in a laboratory
as in the natural sciences, since a closed system cannot be
constructed. We must rather wait until underlying structures,
powers, mechanisms and tendencies become manifest, typically in
partial and inexact regularities, that Lawson (1997, 2003) calls
“demi-regularities”, and as Lawson (1997, 2003) notes, Nicholas
Kaldor called “stylised facts”. And while in a natural experiment we
create contrasts between different experimental settings (in order to
identify the underlying structures, powers, mechanisms and
tendencies that trigger certain events), in social sciences we must
wait until contrasting demi-regularities emerge, in order to develop
economic and social theories about reality.
A question that arises in this context is which alternative theory,
or theories, can this (critical realist) method lead to in order to
providing a better explanation of reality. In this article I will provide
an illustration of how critical realism can help us developing an
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alternative economic and social theory. This does not mean that the
theory to be elaborated here constitutes the critical realist theory.
Critical realism, as a philosophy or methodology, can only under-
labour for the development of substantive theories, and must be
supplemented by further empirical claims, as Lawson (2003) notes.
For developing an alternative economic theory, the contributions
of the Cambridge tradition in economics, which also influenced
critical realism in economics, will prove most useful. In fact, the
method of focusing on “demi-regularities”, which persist through
time, is the classical method, which was recovered by authors of the
Cambridge economic tradition in the XX th century—see Pierangelo
Garegnani (1984).
THE REPRODUCTION OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC
SYSTEM
As noted above, Harcourt (2003) systematises three key
characteristics in Keynes’ thinking which are relevant for
understanding the Cambridge economic tradition: the whole is more
than the sum of the parts; agents act in a context of inescapable
uncertainty; and the existence of a plurality of languages. The
second and third elements that Harcourt identifies are related to the
first element. The fact the reality is deeply interconnected, and that
we can only grasp a part of reality, leads naturally to the existence of
inescapable uncertainty for each agent who can perceive only a part
of the whole.
Each part is an open system related to the whole, and if the whole
is not finite, the whole itself will be also an open system, where
uncertainty is always present. This means also that one single
method or language is not sufficient to address such a complex
reality. Rather, various languages and methods are needed to
capture each part of such a complex whole. This is the third
characteristic noted by Harcourt.
The question that follows, which was faced by Alfred Marshall
(as noted above), is how to grasp reality, if the latter is internally
related in complex ways. Marshall (1920[1890], 1923[1919]), whose
conception of reality was underpinned by a (Hegelian) relational
ontology, provided his method of partial (or particular) equilibrium
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as a solution to the problem of internal relations. In Marshall’s
partial (or particular) equilibrium, we assume that if the time interval
is small enough, we can focus only on what Marshall calls the direct
effects of a change when looking at a given part of the economic
system (for example, when looking at the equilibrium between
supply and demand in a particular market), leaving aside the indirect
effects. Thus, the method of partial (or particular) equilibrium is
feasible for shorter intervals of time, but not for longer intervals of
time.
Piero Sraffa criticises this approach, and develops an alternative
way to take into account internal relations. Rather than making the
interval of time small enough so that nothing happens in between,
as Marshall does (inspired in the Newtonian method of
differentiation), Sraffa suggests looking at the objective conditions
for the reproduction of the economic system as a whole at a given
moment in time. So for Sraffa the starting point is the study of the
conditions for the reproduction of the whole economic system at a
given moment, rather than focusing on the effects of changes on a
given part of the system. By using reproduction, rather than equilibrium,
as our key theoretical concept, we are led back into the theoretical
world of the old classical political economists from William Petty to
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, which was later recovered by Karl
Marx—this issue is discussed in more detail in Martins (2013).
Under such a conception, which focuses on the conditions of
reproduction of an interconnected whole, rather than the
equilibrium conditions of isolated parts, we reach a different
perspective of the economy and society. Prices are seen as the prices
that ensure the reproduction of the economic system, i.e., the prices
that cover the cost of (re)production, rather than the prices that
equilibrate supply and demand. And human agency is studied in
terms of the conditions for the reproduction of social activity,
rather than as the strategic interaction of isolated agents which leads
to the equilibrium of strategies.
The analysis of the reproduction of the economy, and the
analysis of the reproduction of society comes together not only in
the study of production, and of the division of labour, but also in
the study of distribution, through the notion of the surplus. When
prices cover more than the cost of (re)production, we have an
economic surplus to be distributed. The way in which the surplus is
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distributed depends upon the social classes which are reproduced
through human activity.
CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND VULGAR
POLITICAL ECONOMY
The classical conception was slowly abandoned after Ricardo.
After Ricardo, political economy became, especially with Nassau
Senior (1836, p. 138), the science that studies the behaviour of an
agent who “desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice
as possible” (the latter quotation is Senior’s first postulate of
economics). Rather than focusing on the study of the objective
conditions of reproduction of economy and society, political
economy started to adopt a deductivist approach, in which
economic laws are deduced from a set of postulates, such as
Senior’s first postulate.
Because Senior’s first postulate states a claim concerning human
desires, subjective elements start to play a key role in economic
analysis after Ricardo. And since those subjective elements are taken
as exogenous data, or initial postulates, from which economic laws
are deduced, political economy becomes characterised not only by a
subjectivist theory, but also by a deductivist method.
Sraffa following Marx, distinguishes in his unpublished
manuscripts between “classical political economy”, as the approach
of Petty, Smith and Ricardo, and “vulgar political economy”, which
is the approach of Malthus, Senior, Stuart Mill and Cairnes—see
Martins (2012a). Since vulgar economy is a movement that refers
often to Ricardo’s authority, it is often termed as “Ricardian”
economics, and identified with classical political economy. But the
method and theory of the classical approach, of Petty, Smith and
Ricardo, which was later continued by Marx, was very different
from the method and theory of the vulgar approach.
While the vulgar economists explain value in terms of supply and
demand, the classical economists try to go beyond supply and
demand, towards the underlying causes of value, connected to the
cost of production, measured in terms of human labour. This
difference can be seen in the exchanges between Ricardo and
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Malthus. Thus Ricardo wrote to Malthus, in a letter dated from 9
October 1820:
You say demand and supply regulates value—this, I think, is saying
nothing… it is supply which regulates value—and supply is itself
controlled by comparative cost of production. (Ricardo, as cited in
Kurz and Salvadori 2002, p. 56)
Marx believed that Ricardo’s classical theory was a scientific
analysis of the nature of value, while supply and demand analysis
was a vulgarisation of Smith’s insights, which stays only at the level
of appearances, without studying underlying causes (namely, the
underlying conditions of production, and the labour process) as
Petty, Smith and Ricardo did. In this context, Marx writes:
Once and for all I may here state, that by classical Political
Economy, I understand that economy which, since the time of
W. Petty, has investigated the real relations of production in
bourgeois society, in contradistinction to vulgar economy, which
deals with appearances only, ruminates without ceasing on the
materials long since provided by scientific economy, and there
seeks plausible explanations of the most obtrusive phenomena, for
bourgeois daily use, but for the rest, confines itself to systematising
in a pedantic way, and proclaiming for everlasting truths, the trite
ideas held by the self-complacent bourgeoisie with regard to their
own world, to them the best of all possible worlds. (Marx
1999[1867], p. 493)
Economics takes a decisive step in the deductivist and
subjectivist direction, initiated with the vulgar approach, with the
marginalist revolution, when authors like Carl Menger, Stanley
Jevons, and Leon Walras, take subjective preferences, and marginal
utility in particular, to be the source of value.
While classical political economy focused on human labour as
the source of value, marginalism focused on subjective utility. While
labour can be, and in fact often is, a social activity, subjective utility
is always the utility of an individual, as Luigi Pasinetti (1993)
explains. So while the classical framework, of reproduction and
distribution of a surplus produced by labour, can be combined with
a social theory that presupposes a social agent placed in a given
social structure (an aspect that can be seen more clearly in Marx’s
development of classical political economy), the marginalist theory
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led to a framework which relied upon an irreducible methodological
atomism, starting from the notion of an individual who engages in
exchange in order to optimise the individual’s subjective utility.
Jevons and Walras suggest also the adoption of mathematical
methods within economics, anticipating the mathematical
revolution that took place during the twentieth century, turning
economics into a discipline characterised by mathematico-
deductivist methods.
Marginalism, being concerned essentially with the activity of
optimisation of isolated individuals, leads to a fundamentally static
approach, where economics aims at searching for equilibrium.
Classical political economy, in contrast, was concerned with the
reproduction of the mode of production, and of social classes, in a
dynamic approach to reality. We can further elaborate the
distinction between classical political economy and vulgar economy
by focusing on their differences in terms of the theory of value,
theory of agency, and theory of well-being.
In terms of the theory of value, the key difference was that, for
classical political economy, value depends upon the conditions of
production (and thus prices tend to the cost of production,
measured in terms of human labour), while vulgar economy was
already heading towards a perspective where value is determined by
the interaction between supply and demand, which was only fully
achieved later, in Marshall’s neoclassical economics. After Marx, it
was Sraffa (1960) who engaged in a more consistent rejection of the
vulgar conception, and development of the classical conception, as
Ronald Meek (1961) argues.
In terms of the theory of agency, for classical political economy
human action presupposes an existent social structure, constituted
by social classes. Vulgar economy, on the other hand, adopts a
methodological individualism, where society can be totally explained
in terms of the interaction of self-interest seeking individuals (who
create society through social contract). While for classical political
economists the human individual is already a social being, in vulgar
economy the starting point is the isolated individual. After Marx, the
classical conception has been developed by many authors, not least
within critical realism in economics. The vulgar conception, in
contrast, underpins contemporary mainstream economics.
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In terms of the theory of well-being, for classical political
economy there is a multidimensional conception of well-being,
where the latter depends upon several activities, and the
achievements of human beings in various dimensions. This
conception appears more clearly in the writings of Smith and Marx.
In vulgar economy, on the other hand, well-being is seen in terms
of one dimension, namely in terms of the subjective pleasure, or the
utility, which is brought by any activity. After Marx, the classical
conception is developed more clearly by Amartya Sen, who also
criticises mainstream economics and its reliance on the vulgar
(utilitarian) conception of well-being. Vivian Walsh (2000) and
Hilary Putnam (2002) indeed argue that while Sraffa’s revival of the
classical theory of value was a first stage of a revival of classical
political economy, Sen’s revival of the classical theory of well-being
was a second stage of a revival of classical political economy.
These different conceptions at the level of the theory of value,
theory of agency, and theory of well-being, spring also from the fact
that classical political economy was grounded on an objective
analysis, while vulgar economy was grounded on a subjective
analysis. Thus, for the classical theory of value, value was
determined by the objective conditions of production. But for
vulgar economic theory, the subjective preferences that shape
demand are an ultimate (exogenous) determinant of value.
The emphasis on subjectivism brought subjective self-interest as
the starting point of the vulgar (and marginalist) theory of agency,
and subjective well-being as the starting point of their theory of
well-being. For classical political economy, on the other hand, the
starting point for the theory of agency is not the subjective self-
interest of the isolated individual, but social classes which have an
objective existence. And for classical political economy, human
well-being depends upon objective human achievements in various
objective activities, not upon subjective preferences.
Vulgar economy started thus a deductivist and subjectivist
approach, where economic activity is studied in terms of the
behaviour of individuals who pursue self-interest, and where all
results are deduced from this postulate concerning human
behaviour, and where subjective preferences are taken uncritically as
exogenous data, from which equilibrium results are deduced.
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ALTHUSSER AND CRITICAL REALISM
The contemporary distinction between heterodox economics
and mainstream economics can be seen as a continuation of the
earlier distinction between classical political economy and vulgar
economy elaborated above. Lawson (2003) argues that the social
ontology presupposed by the various heterodox traditions is a
similar one: it is a social ontology which presupposes that human
agents continuously reproduce and transform an underlying social
structure, and slot into the (internally related) social positions that
are part of the social structure. This social ontology is clearly closer
to Marx’s development of classical political economy, than to the
self-interest seeker of vulgar economy.
Lawson (2003, 2006) provides a general social ontology which
systematises these views of heterodox economists on economic
institutions, and which contrasts with the methodological
individualism that underpins mainstream economics. In fact, we can
say that while the revival of classical political economy in the
Cambridge tradition, led by Sraffa (1960), focused on the
reproduction of economic structures (essentially on the reproduction
and distribution of the economic surplus), critical realism in
economics has been concerned with the reproduction of social
structures. And this process takes place through the activity of
social agents, as they reproduce the economy and society.
In so doing, these different projects within the Cambridge
economic tradition can be interpreted as a return to the framework
of classical political economy, as developed to its more elaborate
stage by Marx: a framework that focused on the economic
reproduction of a surplus, and on its (institutional) distribution
through the various social classes under a given social structure.
In this sense, Sraffa’s revival of classical political economy and
critical realism in economics have been concerned with the same
type of (dynamic) phenomenon, namely the reproduction of the
economy and society, with Sraffa’s revival of classical political
economy focusing on the economic system, and critical realism
focusing more on society, or on both the economy and society
(while also systematising the ontological underpinnings of the
heterodox traditions). Hence both approaches seem to be not only
compatible, but also complementary.
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The systematisation of the ontological underpinnings of the
heterodox economic traditions led Lawson to develop a project on
social ontology, which was influenced both by the work of
heterodox economists, and by the philosophy of critical realism
(Bhaskar 1997[1975], 1998[1979]), which helped systematising the
ontological underpinnings of those economists, in search of a more
realist approach to economics (Lawson 1997, p. xiii).
The project of critical realism was initiated with Roy Bhaskar’s
1975 book A Realist Theory of Science, and was developed by many
other authors subsequently—see Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson
and Norrie (1998) for an important collection of texts. Critical
realism provides a development of Marx’s social theory and
philosophy. However, Marx’s social theory had been further
elaborated by many Marxist authors before. And critical realism is
strongly influenced by the developments of Marxist social theory,
more precisely, the developments undertaken by Louis Althusser.
The influence of Althusser appears in some references that
critical realists make to Althusser—for example, in Bhaskar
(1998[1979]) or Collier (1989). But Althusser’s influence appears in
a clearer way in the critical realist ideas. Bhaskar’s (1997[1975])
theory of knowledge, where knowledge is a produced means of
production of further knowledge, is very similar to Althusser’s
conception of practice. Althusser writes:
By practice in general I shall mean any process of transformation of a
determinate given raw material into a determinate product, a
transformation effectuated by a determinate human labour, using a
determinate means (of “production”). (Althusser 2005[1965],
p. 166)
Althusser (2005[1965], p. 167) also uses this transformational
conception for explaining “theoretical practice”, in which the “raw
material” consists of “representations, conceptions, facts”. For
Althusser (2005[1965], p. 167, original emphasis), theoretical
practice includes “scientific theoretical practice”, and also “pre-
scientific theoretical practice”, that is, “‘ideological’theoretical
practice”.
Althusser reaches a conception of the production of knowledge
which is very similar to the one developed afterwards by Bhaskar,
and by Lawson. Lawson writes:
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knowledge must be recognised as a produced means of production
(of further knowledge) and science as an ongoing transformative
social activity. Knowledge is a social product, actively produced by
means of antecedent social products. (Lawson 1997, p. 25)
Bhaskar and Lawson stress the coexistence of a transitive
dimension to knowledge, or epistemology, and an intransitive
dimension, or ontology. The transformation of knowledge takes
place in the transitive dimension. But the transformational
conception, inspired of course in Marx’s analysis of the labour
process, can also be applied to social practices, as Althusser, and
critical realists, do.
The similarities between Althusser and critical realism become
clear again if we look at Althusser’s theory of ideology. Althusser
(2001[1971], p. 119) argues that “ideology hails or interpellates
individuals as subjects”. According to Althusser (2001[1971],
p. 117), “the category of the ‘subject’ is constitutive of ideology,
which only exists by constituting concrete subjects as subjects”. An
individual becomes a subject when interprellated, while assuming
the role of the subject, which is a social position within the realm of
ideology. The emphasis on the reproduction of social structures,
constituted by social positions into which human individuals slot
(becoming constituted as “subjects”, as Althusser notes) is a crucial
similarity between Althusser and critical realism.
Althusser (2001[1971], pp. 85–90) starts his famous essay on
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” with a study of the
reproduction process, focusing on the reproduction of the means of
production, and the reproduction of labour-power. Althusser
(2001[1971], p. 86) refers to “the genius of Quesnay”, who posed
the problem of reproduction, and “the genius of Marx, who solved
it.” Effectively, as Sraffa (1960, p. 93) explains, “[i]t is of course in
Quesnay’s Tableau Economique that is found the original picture of
the system of production and consumption as a circular process”,
that is, the study of the economic process reproduction that Marx
and Sraffa develop.
While Sraffa focused on the reproduction of the economic
process, Althusser addresses the conditions of reproduction at the
level of social structures. Indeed, the whole essay “Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses” can be interpreted as a study of the
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conditions of reproduction at the level of ideology, which are also
essential for the reproduction of the capitalist process.
The same can be said of the critical realist transformational
model of social activity, developed by Bhaskar, Lawson and others
(see Archer et al., 1998), which explains the reproduction of social
structures, in a conception where social structures are constituted by
social positions, each attached to social rules, where individuals slot
into these positions, as noted above. If we replace “social
structures” by “ideology”, and “social positions” by “ideological
subject”, we have a translation of critical realist language into
Althusserian language. And the underlying idea, that human activity
presupposes a set of social or ideological preconditions, is the same
in both cases.
GRAMSCI AND ALTHUSSER
Althusser notes that he was not the only one to develop Marx’s
insights in this way. When Althusser develops his Marxist approach,
he sees it as a continuation of a project initiated by Marx and
Engels, and continued by Antonio Gramsci. Thus Althusser writes:
Who has really attempted to follow up the explorations of Marx and
Engels? I can only think of Gramsci. (Althusser 2005[1965], p. 114,
original emphasis)
But if only Gramsci has really followed Marx and Engels, and if
Althusser is also trying to follow them, as Althusser claims to be
doing, it becomes clear that Althusser sees his project as a
continuation of a project that had only been continued before by
Gramsci. Althusser also notes:
To my knowledge, Gramsci is the only one who went at any
distance in the road I am taking. He had the ‘remarkable’ idea that
the State could be reduced to the (Repressive) State Apparatus, but
included, as he put it, a certain number of institutions from ‘civil
society’: the Church, the Schools, the trade unions, etc.
Unfortunately, Gramsci did not systematize his institutions, which
remained in the form of acute but fragmentary notes. (Althusser
2001[1971], p. 95, original emphasis)
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This does not, of course, mean that Althusser believes that his
project is entirely similar to Gramsci’s. A difference that Althusser
notes between his conception and Gramsci’s is the scope of the
analysis. Althusser writes:
But it should be realized that Gramsci’s concept of the intellectual is
infinitely wider than ours, that is, it is not defined by the idea
intellectuals have of themselves, but by their social role as organizers
and (more or less subordinate) leaders. (Althusser 2005[1965],
p. 105n)
If this is so, Gramsci’s conception was quite close to the critical
realist relational ontology. For Gramsci focuses on the social role,
that is, on the social position, that each agent has. For Gramsci,
human action presupposes the existence of social relations, but
human agents are themselves changed by social relations:
Human nature is the ensemble of social relations that determines a
historically defined consciousness, and this consciousness indicates
what is “natural” and what is not [and human nature is
contradictory because it is the ensemble of social relations].
People also speak of “second nature”; a certain habit becomes
second nature, but was the “first nature” really “first”? Is there not
in this commonsense mode of expression some indication of the
historicity of human nature? (Gramsci 1975, Notebook 8,
paragraph 151)
Gramsci’s point here is the same which is made by Lawson
(2009, p. 102) when he argues that “human beings are not so much
socially embedded as in large part socially constituted”. Starting
from Marx’s notion that “Human nature is the ensemble of social
relations”, Gramsci reaches the conclusion that human nature, like
human consciousness, is a historically specific fact:
That “human nature” is the “ensemble of social relations” is the
most satisfying answer, because it includes the idea of becoming—
man becomes, he changes continuously with the changing of social
relations—and because it negates “man in general”. Indeed, social
relations are expressed by diverse groups of man that presuppose
one another, and their unity is dialectical, not formal. Man is
aristocratic insofar as man is a serf, etc. (Gramsci 1975, Notebook
7, paragraph 35)
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Here, Gramsci is pointing towards not only the fact that, as
Lawson (2003, p. 43) also argues, “social reality is a process”, but also
to the fact that social positions are internally related.
Gramsci was much influenced by the philosopher Henri
Bergson, who influenced philosophers like Alfred North
Whitehead. Inspired in Bergson, Whitehead (1929) developed a
conception of reality as a process, and in so doing elaborated a
philosophy of internal relations that was very influential in
Cambridge. In fact, Bergson influenced the whole Cambridge
philosophical environment through Wildon Carr, who translated
Bergson’s contribution to English.
Gramsci was sometimes accused of Bergsonian idealism by other
Marxists. But noted above, Althusser argues that Gramsci is the
only author who travelled the road that he, Althusser, is travelling.
And Althusser also believes that this the only road where we really
find a development of the project of Marx and Engels, as noted
above, since he writes that only Gramsci developed the explorations
of Marx and Engels. If we put these claims together (that only
Gramsci developed the perspective Alhusser is developing, and that
only Gramsci followed the path pioneered by Marx and Engels,
without however systematising his institutional analysis), the logical
conclusion is that Althusser developed the only systematic
elaboration of Marxism that really is in line with Marx and Engels.
This is a strong claim, which I will not elaborate here, since this
is a very complicated topic for addressing in the context of the
present article. For the purposes of the present article, it is sufficient
to note that Althusser’s project consists in a development of Marx’s
social theory that focuses on the reproduction of ideology and
institutions. That is, Althusser’s project is a development of Marx’s
analysis of the reproduction of social structures.
But the reproduction of social structures, constituted by social
positions into which human individuals slot, is precisely what
Bhaskar, Lawson, and many other critical realists develop within the
transformational conception of social activity. We can thus see how
critical realism is in line with Marx’s social theory, as developed by
the authors who were particularly concerned with the role of
ideology, like Gramsci and Althusser. Just like Sraffa develops
classical economic theory starting from where Marx left it, so does
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critical realism continue the social theory that was already being
developed by Marx.
Sraffa himself also had a conception of social activity much
influenced by Gramsci, as John Davis (2002) and Amartya Sen
(2003) argue. But in his published writings, Sraffa addressed only
the conditions for the reproduction of economic activity. Within the
Cambridge tradition, the conditions for the reproduction of social
activity were developed only much later, within Lawson’s social
ontology. And in both cases (of Sraffa and Lawson), we find a
development of a perspective initiated with classical political
economy, and brought to its more advanced stage by Marx.
Of course, Marx was not the only important influence for the
way critical realism was developed within economics. Many
economists of the Cambridge tradition are relevant to
understanding this project too. Lawson’s project has been based in,
and mostly associated with, Cambridge, and naturally we find not
only key classical political economists like Smith and Marx in the list
of important influences Lawson (1997, p. xiii) names, but also many
Cambridge economists such as Keynes, Dobb, Marshall or Kaldor,
or economists strongly influenced by the Cambridge economic
tradition like Shackle. Also, other economists mentioned, such as
Menger and Hayek, are in fact criticised by Lawson, due to their
subjectivist approach, where subjective conceptions are taken as
exogenous data, rather than critically scrutinised.
In critical realism in economics, we have a critical methodology,
which studies the conditions of possibility underlying our
conceptions of reality, rather than a deductivist methodology that
simply takes subjective conceptions as exogenous data from which
economic laws can be deduced. This critical methodology is
connected to a theory of reproduction of a whole, rather than a
theory of equilibrium between isolated parts. And we also have an
objective approach to reality, where ontological categories cannot
be reduced to our epistemological, or subjectivist, conceptions. In
fact, even our subjective wants must be distinguished from our
objective needs, within critical realism. Thus subjective wants, or
preferences, cannot be the basis of an economic or social theory, as
Lawson (1997) notes in his critique of Menger and Hayek.
And because reality is dynamic, open and interconnected,
mathematical-dedutivist methods, such as those pioneered by
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Jevons and Walras, and later developed within mainstream
economics especially throughout the twentieth century, are also
found to be inappropriate—see Martins (2012b) for a discussion. In
this sense, we have in critical realism a criticism of both branches of
marginalism (not only of Menger’s branch, due to its subjectivism,
but also of Jevons and Walras, due to the mathematisation of
reality). We have in critical realism a return to the elements of
classical project that Marx also tried to develop, where economics is
the critical study of the conditions of reproduction of economy and
society, rather than a deductivist exercise which takes subjective
preference as exogenous data.
ONTOLOGY AND THE CAMBRIDGE TRADITION
Another important connection between the revival of classical
political economy in the Cambridge tradition, and critical realism,
concerns the topic of ontology. Remember Harcourt (2003)
identified three key characteristics of Keynes’ thinking especially
relevant for the Cambridge economic tradition: the idea that the
whole is more than the sum of the parts; the idea that agents act in a
context of inescapable uncertainty; and the existence of a plurality
of languages.
These three key ideas are exactly the same Lawson is developing
in critical realism: the idea that the whole is more than the sum of
the parts is conceptualised in critical realism through the notion of
internal relation; the idea that agents act in a context of inescapable
uncertainty is conceptualised in critical realism as a case of an open
system; and the existence of a plurality of languages is something
Lawson accepts when attempting to provide a pluralist ontological
framework that can accommodate the various heterodox traditions.
The nature of the Cambridge heterodoxy can be found at this
ontological level. The theories which can then be developed are best
seen as a consequence of this ontological conception, which leads
to:
– a critical (rather than a deductivist) methodology;
– a theory centred on reproduction (rather than on equilibrium);
– a realist and objective (rather than a subjectivist) conception of
reality.
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A central theoretical concept for understanding the more
substantive aspects of the reproduction of the economy and society
is the social surplus, which is the part of production that is not
necessary for the reproduction of the existing socio-economic
system. The distribution of the social surplus, a central aspect for
the Cambridge economic tradition, is essential for understanding
not only the reproduction of the economy, but also the
reproduction of society. It is through the explanation of the
distribution of the surplus that we can understand the economic
and social structure, including the dynamics of capitalism, and the
stratification of society.
The ontological notion of internal relation leads us to a study of
the conditions of reproduction of the economy and society as a
whole, rather than a study of a given part while assuming everything
else constant as Marshall does. In the study of society, it helps us
understanding how the distribution of the surplus depends on a
network of internally related social positions which constitute the
social classes that share the surplus. But the notion of internal
relation can also help us understanding the notion of the surplus.
For at the level of the economy, once we see the surplus as a
whole, we can then understand how it becomes divided in its
component parts, namely wages, profits and rent, which are
however internally related, in the sense that changes in one of those
components influences the other. This internal relation between the
components of the surplus was essential to Ricardo and Marx.
Unlike Ricardo, Malthus sees the components of the surplus
(wages, profits and rent) as independent from each other, and
formed through the interaction between supply and demand. And
after Ricardo, costs of production are seen as the sum of these three
independent components, rather than seen in terms of the
reproduction of the economic process in its totality, as for Ricardo,
Marx, and later Sraffa.
This is a key reason why Marx distinguishes the “classical”
political economy of Ricardo from the “vulgar” economy of the
authors who came after Ricardo, whose approach is often
(misleadingly) named “Ricardian” economics. For classical political
economy the notion of the surplus is the starting point to
understanding its (internally related) component parts, and the
reproduction of the economy and society.
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For vulgar economy, in contrast, prices are explained in terms of
supply and demand, including the component parts of costs of
production (namely, wages, profits and rent) which are seen as
independent components. As Garegnani (1984) explains, Ricardo
brought consistency by drawing attention to the surplus as the
starting point to our understanding of value, going beyond Smith’s
adding-up theory of prices, where prices are explained in terms of
the sum of their components (as Malthus would also do).
Remember that, as Meek (1961) argues, Sraffa engaged in a
revival of the classical theory of value. Walsh (2000) and Putnam
(2002) further argue that after Sraffa’s revival of the classical theory
of value, we have a revival of the classical (multidimensional) theory
of well-being in the contributions of Sen, in what constitutes,
according to them, a second stage of the revival of classical political
economy—see Martins (2011).
Indeed, Sen’s (1985) capability approach helps us distinguishing
between basic capabilities (essential for achieving a certain standard
of living) and unnecessary luxuries, as Walsh (2000) notes. Thus,
Sen’s capability approach enables us to define a given standard of
living, so that we define the surplus as the part of production that is
not necessary for achieving such a standard of living, constituted by
what Sraffa (1960, p. 7) called “luxury commodities”. The
deductivist and subjectivist approach of mainstream economics, in
contrast, assumes that consumers are never satisfied (and deduce
economic laws from this assumption on subjective preferences),
leading to a scarcity theory instead of a surplus theory.
I would add that Lawson’s contribution constitutes a third stage
of this revival within the Cambridge tradition, but this time centred
not on the theory of value (as Sraffa’s revival), nor on the theory of
well-being (as Sen’s revival), but on the theory of agency, that is, in
social theory. Once we see the contemporary distinction between
heterodox economics and mainstream economics as a continuation
of Marx’s distinction between classical political economy and vulgar
economy, Lawson’s engagement with heterodox economics is more
clearly seen as a continuation of the revival of classical political
economy. And the ontology developed within Lawson’s project
helps us to understand many aspects of the previous revivals.
For example, Lawson’s conception of internal relation helps us
understanding how the various components of value are internally
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related, as Ricardo, Marx and Sraffa saw, and hence prices cannot
be obtained by simply adding up (supposedly) independent
components. The notion of internal relation helps us seeing how
well-being cannot be seen in unidimensional terms, because the
various “functionings” achieved by human beings cannot be simply
added up in order to achieve a unidimensional measure of utility, as
Sen (1985) argues, when proposing his capability approach. In fact,
the notion of internal relation, which Lawson (1997, 2003) has
recently recovered, is essential for an understanding of the
Cambridge economic tradition since Marshall.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The heterodox wing of the Cambridge economic tradition can be
best interpreted as a revival of the economic theory of classical
political economy, with more recent contributions like critical
realism in economics engaging in a revival of the social theory of
classical political economy. Lawson (2006) proposes a conception
which systematises the ontological underpinnings of heterodox
economics. But for understanding the contemporary problems of
capitalism, we must also return to the more substantive revival of
the classical economic theory that took place within the Cambridge
economic tradition.
Mainstream economics, following the vulgar tradition,
emphasises the inevitability of scarcity, and indeed defines
economics as the study of the optimal allocation of scarce
resources. For if subjective preferences are taken to be the source of
value, and if the former are never totally satisfied, scarcity becomes
inevitable. While scarcity was the central notion for vulgar economy,
the central concept for classical political economy was the surplus.
Moving from a (vulgar) scarcity theory to a (classical) surplus theory
opens new possibilities for economics. And for engaging in a fuller
revival of classical surplus theory, which was led to its more
advanced stage by Marx, we must focus not only on the theory of
value (as Sraffa does) and the theory of well-being (as Sen does), but
also on the theory of agency (as Lawson does).
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